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PREDICTABLE MATERIALITY: A NEED FOR
COMMON CRITERIA GOVERNING THE
DISCLOSURE OF CLINICAL TRIAL RESULTS BY
PUBLICLY-TRADED PHARMACEUTICAL
COMPANIES
Katherine Cohen, Joseph W. Cormier, and Mahnu V Davar*
Pharmaceutical companies are among the most heavily regulated
industries in the world.' Successfully navigating the United States'
regulatory framework comprised of numerous state and federal agencies,
while also meeting the expectations of patients, shareholders, employees,
and other stakeholders, is a constant challenge. For publicly-traded
companies regulated by both the Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC") and Food and Drug Administration ("FDA"), this challenge is
particularly acute with respect to disclosure of clinical trial information.
Publicly-traded pharmaceutical companies are required to make certain
information about themselves available to investors and regulators when that
information would be material to the decision of the average shareholder to
buy or sell shares. At a minimum, compliance with securities laws requires
public companies to make such information available in periodic (e.g.
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1. Career Overview: Pharmaceuticals, WETFEET (Dec. 3, 2012),
https://www.wetfeet.com/articles/career-overview-pharmaceuticals; see also Peter
Stonier, An Insight into Careers for Doctors with the UK Pharmaceutical Industry 3,
APBI (Aug. 2011), http://www.abpi.org.uk/our-work/library/industry/Documents/careers-
doctors.pdf.
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annual and quarterly) reports. Such reports must be truthful, accurate, and
not omit material information.
Publicly-traded pharmaceutical companies are also required to make
certain information available under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act ("FDCA") and FDA's implementing regulations and guidance
documents. Under the applicable legal principles, labeling and advertising
describing a medical product must be truthful and non-misleading,3 which
also requires that any facts about the product which are material to safe or
effective use are disclosed.4 Similar to the SEC, regulated companies must
also make a certain minimum amount of information available to FDA in
specific reports such as annual reports and adverse event reports.5
The type of information that ought to be disclosed under the FDA and
SEC regimes appears to be different, i.e., information that is potentially
misleading to the average investor may be different for a consumer or a
doctor. In a series of warning letters, FDA has taken issue with medical
product company press releases that include potentially misleading claims of
safety or efficacy, even when the intent behind these releases may have been
6SEC compliance. And, most problematically, DOJ has indicated an interest
in pursuing omissions of material clinical trial information under expansive
criminal enforcement theories.7 The threat of enforcement has generally
2. See generally, e.g., Form 10-K, SEC. AND ExCH. COMM'N,
http://www.sec.gov/answers/forml0k.htm (last modified Jun. 26, 2009); Form 10-Q,
SEC. AND EXCH. COMM'N, http://www.sec.gov/answers/forml0q.htm (last modified Sept.
2,2011).
3. See 21 U.S.C. § 352(a) (2006); Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA),
21 U.S.C. § 502(a) (2006).
4. See 21 U.S.C. § 352(n)(3); FDCA, 21 U.S.C. § 502(n)(3).
5. See generally, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 314.80 (2006) (postmarketing reporting of
adverse drug experiences); 21 C.F.R. § 314.81(b)(2)(i) (postmarketing annual report
summaries).
6. See, e.g., Erchonia Corp. Warning Letter, FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN. (Jan. 21,
2011), http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/EnforcementActions/WarningLetters/ucm256890.htm
(discussing, among other things, company's press releases regarding clinical study
results); Glyco-Meds.com Warning Letter, FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN. (May 19, 2009),
http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/EnforcementActions/WarningLetters/ucml61269.htm. (citing
a press release that discusses clinical trial results supporting efficacy).
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arisen in one key area of medical product company activity--clinical
research.
What appears to be a "big picture" policy problem actually has some very
real consequences for the legal department of a publicly-traded
pharmaceutical company. If a company makes a decision not to make public
the results of a clinical study because it is deemed "immaterial" under the
securities laws, can it also avoid disclosure under the FDCA? Does an
FDCA-mandated disclosure always trigger a requirement to disclose under
securities laws? Section I of this Note details the specific clinical trial
disclosure requirements of US federal agencies. Section II briefly considers
international and pharmaceutical industry disclosure standards. Finally, in
Section III, this Note discusses the interplay between these requirements and
calls for clarification by both agencies under the principle of fairness, i.e.,
the relevant federal agencies should provide greater regulatory certainty to
the pharmaceutical industry, especially when the stakes are so high.
I. FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY CLINICAL TRIAL DISCLOSURE
REQUIREMENTS
Several administrative agencies play a role in determining requirements
for the disclosure of clinical trial results by publicly-traded pharmaceutical
companies. Relevant regulations promulgated by the Department of Health
and Human Services ("HHS"), the National Institutes of Health ("NIH"), the
FDA, and the SEC are detailed below.
A. HHS, NIH, and FDA Clinical Trial Disclosure Requirements
Since 1997, federal agencies tasked with regulating drugs, devices,
biologics, and public health have incrementally increased requirements for
clinical trial registry and results reporting by pharmaceutical companies.
The evolution of the rules governing clinical trial disclosure, the current
7. See, e.g., Information, United States v. GlaxoSmithKline LLC, C.A. No. 11-
10398-RWZ (D. Mass. filed July 2, 2012), available at http://wwwjustice.gov/opa/gsk-
docs.html (charging GSK with misbranding Paxil based on, inter alia, promoting the
drug to doctors for use in children and adolescents without disclosing to safety issues in
these populations revealed during internal GSK clinical studies); see also Agreed
Statement of Facts, United States v. Abbott Laboratories, Crim. No. 1:12-CR-26 (W.D.
Va. Filed May 7, 2012) (requiring Abbott Labs to accept certain facts as true as part of a
criminal misbranding plea deal, including failing to disclose material safety and efficacy
limitations of Depakote learned through internal clinical studies, during product
promotion to doctors).
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state of these requirements, and possible future developments are outlined
herein.
1. Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997
("FDAMA') and ClinicalTrials.gov
Section 113 of the FDAMA amended the Public Health Service Act
("PHS Act") to add section 402, which directs the Secretary of HHS, acting
through the Director of the NIH, to establish, maintain, and operate a data
bank of information on clinical trials for drugs to treat serious or life-
threatening diseases and conditions. Under the FDAMA, this data bank
would serve as a central resource for current information on clinical trials
that individuals with serious diseases, health care providers, and researchers
could access.9 To fulfill this mandate, FDA and NIH launched the
ClinicalTrials.gov website in February 2000 and established a web-based
protocol registration system sponsors could use to submit required
information.
Under section 113 of the FDAMA, pharmaceutical companies are
required to submit information regarding federally or privately funded
clinical trials if the studies met the following conditions: (1) the trial was
conducted under an investigational new drug ("IND") application, (2) the
drug was designed to treat a serious or life threatening disease," and (3) the
8. Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115,
111 Stat. 2296 (1997).
9. Guidance for Industry: Information Program on Clinical Trials for Serious or
Life-Threatening Diseases and Conditions, FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., 1 (2002),
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Regulatorylnformation/Guidances/UCM126838.pdf
[hereinafter Clinical Trials Guidance].
10. Christine D. Galbraith, Dying to Know: A Demand for Genuine Public Access to
Clinical Trial Results Data, 78 Miss. L.J. 705, 736 (2009); Clinical Trials Guidance,
supra note 9, at 6.
i1. The term life-threatening is defined as: "(1) diseases or conditions where the
likelihood of death is high unless the course of the disease is interrupted and (2) diseases
or conditions with potentially fatal outcomes, where the endpoint of clinical trial analysis
is survival." 21 C.F.R. § 312.81(a) (1999). The seriousness of a disease is a matter of
judgment, but is generally based on such factors as survival, day-to-day functioning, and
the likelihood that the disease, if left untreated, will progress from a less severe condition
to a more serious one. Clinical Trials Guidance, supra note 9, at 5.
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trial was designed to test effectiveness.12 If these criteria were met, sponsors
were required to register the following information no later than twenty-one
days after the trial opened for enrollment:' 3 "[a] description of the purpose
of each experimental drug; [e]ligibility criteria for clinical trial participants;
[d]escription of the location of trial sites; and [a] point of contact for those
wanting to enroll in the trial."l 4
Despite these explicit requirements, section 113 also contained a notable
exemption, allowing clinical trial information to be omitted from the data
bank if the sponsor provided a detailed certification to the Secretary of HHS,
and the Secretary agreed, that such disclosure would substantially interfere
with timely enrollment of subjects in the clinical trial.15 Moreover, because
no negative consequences were associated with a trial sponsor's violation of
the FDAMA,'6 many pharmaceutical companies ignored its mandates and
refused to comply with the law.17
12. FDA considers all Phase 2, Phase 3 and Phase 4 trials with efficacy endpoints as
trials to test effectiveness. Clinical Trials Guidance, supra note 9, at 5.
13. Food and Drug Administration, supra note 8, at 2310. It reads: "not later than 21
days after the approval of the protocol," but because FDA does not approve protocols, the
Agency interpreted this provision to mean twenty-one days after the trial opened for
enrollment. Further, because the text did not specify when sponsors of existing or
ongoing clinical trials would be required to submit information, FDA asked such
sponsors to submit this information within forty-five days after this guidance was made
available through the Federal Register. Clinical Trials Guidance, supra note 9, at 4.
14. 42 U.S.C. § 282(j)(3)(A) (2006).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 282(i)(4). FDA did note, however, that it had not identified specific
instances when disclosure of information would substantially interfere with enrollment of
subjects in a clinical investigation. Clinical Trials Guidance, supra note 9, at 8.
16. Galbraith, supra note 10, at 737. FDA did not require companies to register their
clinical studies in order to utilize data from the investigations for regulatory approval, and
refusal to submit information to the registry did not lead to any monetary penalties. Id.
17. Galbraith, supra note 10, at 737 (noting that studies showed inclusion rates were
low, information was inadequate when it was offered).
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2. The Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007
("FDAAA ") and the Expanded Clinical Trial Registry
The FDAAA was enacted on September 27, 2007, expanding the types of
clinical trials that must be registered on ClinicalTrials.gov, increasing the
number of data elements required for each submission, providing for the
submission of results data, and establishing penalties for non-compliance.1
Generally, FDAAA section 801 required a "responsible party" to register
"applicable clinical trials."19  This "responsible party" was required to
submit certain specified data elements following a specified timeline, or be
subject to penalties. 20 The details of this law are outlined in Table 1, below:
18. Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85,
121 Stat. 823 (2007).
19. Id. at 121 Stat. 904.
20. FDAAA 801 Requirements, CLINICALTRIALS.Gov, http://clinicaltrials.gov/ctz/
magage-recs/fdaaa (last visited Apr. 10, 2013) [hereinafter FDAAA Fact Sheet].
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TABLE 1: FDAAA SECTION 801 CLINICAL TRIAL REGISTRY AND RESULTS
REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
CLINICAL TRIALS
THAT MUST BE
REGISTERED AT
CLINICAL TRIALS. GOV
* "Applicable Clinical Trials" are controlled
interventional studies of drugs, biological
products, or devices that are subject to FDA
regulation, i.e., the trial has one or more sites
in the United States, involves a drug,
product, or device that is manufactured in the
United States, or is conducted under an
investigational new application (IND) or
investigational device exemption ("IDE"). 21
* "Applicable Clinical Device Trials" are
controlled trials that prospectively compare a
device-based intervention subject to FDA
regulation against a control in human
subjects and pediatric post-market
surveillance.22
* "Applicable Clinical Drug Trials" are
controlled clinical investigations other than
Phase 1 trials.23
* "Responsible Party" is the sponsor of the
WHO is RESPONSIBLE clinical trial or the principal investigator
FOR TRIAL ("PI") of such clinical trial if so designated
by a sponsor, as long as the PI is responsible
for conducting the trial and has sufficient
data rights. 2 4
21. Guidance for Sponsors, Investigators, and Institutional Review Boards:
Questions and Answers on Informed Consent Elements, 21 CF.R. § 50.25(c) 2, FOOD
AND DRUG ADMIN. (2012), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/RegulatoryInformation/
Guidances/UCM291085.pdf.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. FDAAA Fact Sheet, supra note 20.
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* For registry of new studies, the responsible
party must submit descriptive, 2 5
26 27
recruitment,2 6  location/contact, and
administrative information. 2 8
REQUIRED DATA * For results of completed studies, the
ELEMENTS responsible party must submit demographic
characteristics, number of dropouts, primary
and secondary outcome measures, point of
contact, and certain agreements between the
sponsor and the PI.2 9
* New studies must be registered within twenty-
one days of first patient enrollment.
* Ongoing studies must update the registry every
twelve months.
TIMING OF * Recruitment status must be updated within
REGISTRATION AT thirty days of any change.
CLINICAL TRIALS. GOV * Results must be registered within one year of
the estimated or actual date of last patient's
last visit (whichever is earlier), and adverse
events data collected and reported within two
years.30
PENALTIES FOR FAILING * Civil monetary penalties.
TO REGISTER * Withholding or recovery of NIH grant funds.
25. Clinical Trials Disclosure and Reporting Compliance: Navigating Overlapping
and Evolving Federal and State Transparency Requirements, STRAFFORD 9 (2011),
http://media.straffordpub.com/products/clinical-trials-disclosure-and-reporting-
compliance-2011-02-03/presentation.pdf [hereinafter FDAAA Deck]. The term
descriptive includes information such as title, trial design, and primary and secondary
outcome measures. Id.
26. FDAAA Deck, supra note 25. This includes patient eligibility and recruitment
status. Id.
27. Id. This must be site-specific information. Id.
28. Id. This includes the protocol number and IND/IDE information. Id.
29. FDAAA Deck, supra note 25, at 10.
30. Id. at 11.
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* Any application or report submitted to FDA
under sections 505, 510(k), 515, or 520(m)
of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
("FDCA") or under section 351 of the PHS
Act must include a certification of
compliance.'
While the FDAAA remedied several of the major shortcomings associated
with the FDAMA by adding monetary penalties and expanding the registry
to clinical trials related to all conditions, it also contained some significant
limitations. For example, submissions were not required for Phase 1 trials,
observational trials, or older trials of drugs approved before the FDAAA was
enacted and no longer the subject of ongoing trials.32 Further, although the
FDAAA required the Secretary of HHS to expand the clinical trials registry
to include results of clinical trials, the only explicit provisions requiring
results disclosure in the initial amendment were relatively narrow.
The FDAAA provides for disclosure of particular categories of
information in three successive stages. In the first stage, FDA links
ClinicalTrials.gov registry entries to a limited group of result information,
including FDA public health advisories, as well as any summary documents
detailing FDA advisor committee meetings that considered a drug subject
to a Phase 3 or 4 trial. The second stage of disclosure involves expanding
the clinical trial results database to reflect the data elements listed in the
table above, including demographic characteristics of patients participating
in the study and the number of participant withdrawals. Additionally, while
this second stage of implementation provides for the disclosure of any
agreements restricting a PI's ability to publicly discuss the results of a trial,
this provision excludes agreements with entities other than PIs, such as
medical school academic scientists and PIs employed by the sponsor. 34
Even more limiting, these second stage disclosure requirements excluded
Phase 1 trials and trials for drugs that ultimately failed to receive FDA
approval.35
31. FDAAA Fact Sheet, supra note 20.
32. FDAAA Deck, supra note 25, at 13.
33. Galbraith, supra note 10, at 742.
34. Id. at 743.
35. Id. at 744.
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The final stage results disclosure requirements remain largely
undetermined. The FDAAA only requires that, "to provide more complete
results information and to enhance patient access to and understanding of the
results of clinical trials, not later than 3 years after the date of the enactment
of the [FDAAA], the Secretary shall by regulation expand the registry and
results data bank." 3 6 The statute requires NIH to hold a public meeting to
obtain input from interested parties before additional regulations are
promulgated.37 Although this meeting was held in April 2009, the Secretary
has not issued a rule expanding registration and results reporting at
ClinicalTrials.gov. Section 3 below addresses possible provisions that may
be included in these third stage disclosure requirements based on the topics
discussed during the 2009 meeting.
In addition to these limitations, the FDAAA also permits the Director of
the NIH to grant extensions of second and third stage data submission
requirements. The Director is authorized to provide relief from disclosure
obligations if a request demonstrates "good cause;" further, there is no
explicit time limitation on such extensions, if granted. In a different vein,
because the FDAAA preempted state provisions relating to the registration
of clinical trials or disclosure of study results in a database, states such as
Maine that introduced legislation concerning clinical trials are now
foreclosed from correcting deficiencies in the federal law through state
legislation.4 0
3. The Future ofFDA, HHS, and NIH Clinical Trial Registry and
Reporting Requirements
As noted above, the Secretary of HHS has not yet fulfilled FDAAA's
mandate to clarify and expand registration and results reporting
requirements. During the 2009 public meeting, representatives from
36. 42 U.S.C. § 282(j)(3)(D)(i) (2006).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 282(j)(3)(D)(vii).
38. Galbraith, supra note 10, at 749.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 750. It should be noted, however, that while Maine acknowledges federal
preemption of some of its reporting requirements, it emphasizes the need for compliance
with state law pending the issuance of the final federal regulations implementing FDAAA
stage three disclosure requirements. FDAAA Deck, supra note 25, at 22.
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physician, disease-related advocacy, consumer, and pharmaceutical industry
groups discussed a variety of topics. Following the meeting, many
stakeholder groups also submitted written comments containing more
detailed responses to the specific questions posed by the NIH in its Federal
Register notice for the 2009 meeting.4' Topics and themes raised in
representative pre-registered speeches and submitted comments are outlined
below:
PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH AND MANUFACTURERS OF AMERICA
("PHRMA")-Generally, PhRMA noted a need to balance increased
transparency with respect for the protection of intellectual property and
proprietary business information. Therefore, PhRMA supported a
requirement that results information for clinical trials of approved and
unapproved medicines, for which research programs are discontinued42 be
provided when those trials involve patients (rather than healthy
volunteers).43 PhRMA's comments also touched on the following specific
issues:
NARRATIVE SUMMARIES: PhRMA felt that narrative summaries of
trial results written in technical language for a medical or scientific
audience could be included in the results data bank without being
misleading or promotional.44 Nevertheless, PhRMA asked NIH to work
with the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors ("ICMJE")
41. See HHS, NLM Public Meeting on Expansion of the Clinical Trials Registry and
Results Data Bank, REGULATIONS.GOV 48 (2009), http://www.regulations.gov/#!docket
Detail;dct=SR;rpp=25;po=0;D=NIH-2009-0002 [hereinafter Public Meeting].
42. PhRMA defined discontinued as: the company is no longer studying the
molecule, does not expect to resume studying it, and has no plans for the molecule on its
own or through collaboration or out-licensing. PhRMA also noted that, because FDA
monitors the use and safety of products during IND phase, there is no safety reason for
public disclosure of research results before FDA approval or the discontinuation of
research. PhRMA, Docket No. NIH-2009-0002, 4 Public Meeting on Expansion of the
Clinical Trial Registry and Results Data Bank (Jun. 23, 2009) [hereinafter PhRMA
Comments].
43. Id. at 3-4.
44. Id. at 5. More research and consideration needed before including narrative
summaries in nontechnical language since those would be more susceptible to being
considered misleading or promotional. It is hard to translate trial results and those
scientific documents into lay language, especially if the results are inconclusive or have
statistical limitations. Id. at 8.
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to ensure that posting these summaries would not interfere with a
sponsor's ability to publish study results in journals; it also asked FDA
to issue final guidance defining what would be considered unlawful
promotion in the context of the trial results data bank, since many trials
involve off-label uses of approved drug products.45
ADDITIONAL NONTECHNICAL INFORMATION: PhRMA requested that
NIH create a standardized glossa defining technical terms that appear
frequently in the data bank. 6 PhRMA also suggested that
ClinicalTrials.gov inform patients that information in the registry
should not replace ap ropriate consultation with healthcare
professionals for treatment.
VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURES: PhRMA objected to NIH's current
treatment of voluntary submissions as if they were required, i.e.,
refusing to post information if one or more of the mandatory data
elements are missing. PhRMA asserted that sponsors may wish to
provide early information while protecting confidential information that
risks a competitive disadvantage.48
CONSUMERS UNION-This organization expressed concern with the
overall integrity of the clinical trial process and questioned audit and
oversight levels.49 Specifically, the Consumers Union felt that the results
of all clinical trials, including Phase I trials and unsuccessful trials, should
be made available one or two years after the trial's conclusion.50 Finally,
it asserted that narrative summaries were inherently misleading, could not
be trusted, and should not be included in the data bank.5'
45. Id. at 6-7.
46. Id. at 10.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 18-19.
49. Prescription Drug User Fee Act: Hearing on H.R. 6181 Before the Subcomm. on
Health and Comm. on Commerce, I10th Cong. 1 (2007) (statement of Jim Guest,
President of the Consumers Union, on Risk Evaluation, Mitigation Strategies and Clinical
Trials).
50. Id. at 98-99.
51. Public Meeting, supra note 41.
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COLORECTAL CANCER COALITION ("C3")-C3 expressed a
commitment to providing clinical trial results fairly and honestly,
including negative conclusions. The coalition also felt strongly that the
results data bank should be presented in a simple and straightforward way,
noting that patients have had difficulty navigating the current version of
ClinicalTrials.gov.52
After reviewing submitted comments, NIH issued a notice of proposed
rulemaking in the Fall of 2011. In this notice, NIH expressed its intent to
enhance clinical trial and adverse event reporting requirements pursuant to
FDAAA section 801. The Agency noted that the regulations would be
crafted to fulfill the following objectives: identify the trials subject to
results reporting requirements; determine the specific information and
format for submission to ClinicalTrials.gov; create deadlines for registering
and reporting results; outline procedures for extending deadlines and
waiving submission requirements; and provide for agency review and public
posting of submitted information.
There have also been legislative efforts to increase the clinical trial results
reporting commitments of pharmaceutical companies. In April 2012,
Representative Tom Reed (R-NY) introduced H.R. 5283, a bill to amend the
PHS Act to enhance clinical trial registry data bank reporting requirements
and enforcement measures.54 Specifically, this legislation would amend the
definition of "applicable clinical trial" to clarify that results reportin
requirements apply to trials with both positive and negative outcomes.
H.R. 5283 would also broaden the scope of FDAAA, including clinical trials
funded by the Department of Defense, in addition to those funded by HHS
agencies. Further, the bill would enhance enforcement provisions,
52. Id.
53. HHS/NIH, Expanded Registration and Results Reporting at ClinicalTrials.gov,
REGINFO.GOV (2011), http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaViewRule?publd=
2011 10&RIN=0925-AA55.
54. H.R. 5283, 112th Cong. (2012).
55. Kurt R. Karst, New Bill Would Change Clinical Trial Registry Reporting
Requirements and Enforcement Measures for Studies Supported by Federal Grants, FDA
LAW BLOG, (May 3, 2012), http://www.fdalawblog.net/fda law blog-hyman
phelps/2012/05/new-bill-would-change-clinical-trial-registry-reporting-requirements-
and-enforcement-measures-for-st.html.
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mandating the revocation of federal grant funding if pharmaceutical
companies failed to report required trial information. 56
Finally, certain provisions of recent Corporate Integrity Agreements
("CIAs") entered into between the HHS Office of the Inspector General
("OIG") and pharmaceutical companies represent an additional signal that
the government intends to enhance industry compliance with results
reporting requirements. Agreements made with Forest Laboratories and
Novartis, for example, included requirements that these companies would
publish information about clinical trial outcomes and results. Thus, given
the confluence of amplified activity and attention on the part of NIH,
Congress, and OIG to enhancing clinical trial results reporting requirements,
it is likely that pharmaceutical companies' duties to disclose testing
outcomes will increase in the coming years.
B. SEC Clinical Trial Disclosure Requirements
Publicly-traded pharmaceutical companies, like all other public
companies, are subject to regulation by the SEC. Pursuant to the Securities
Act of 1933 ("1933 Act") and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ( "1934
Act"), the SEC regulates company disclosures relevant to the purchase or
sale of securities on the nation's public exchanges.58 In recent years, the
SEC has increasingly pursued enforcement actions against publicly-traded
pharmaceutical companies related to allegedly improper disclosures of
company information. Furthermore, because the forecast results for
publicly-traded pharmaceutical companies are volatile due to the
complexities of research and development and the FDA approval process,
these companies are especially vulnerable to private shareholder suits
alleging violations of federal securities laws. 9 Despite these high stakes,
56. Id.
57. See FDAAA Deck, supra note 25, at 61-68 (describing CIA between OIG and
Forest Laboratories requiring the company to publish information regarding clinical trial
outcomes following an investigation of the company's concealment of negative pediatric
studies for Celexa and Lexapro, as well as the 2010 Novartis CIA that required the
company to register all clinical studies and report results on ClinicalTrials.gov).
58. See General Rules and Regulations, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240 (2000).
59. See Stuart R. Cohn & Erin M. Swick, The Sitting Ducks of Securities Class
Action Litigation: Bio-Pharmas and the Need for Improved Evaluation of Scientific Data,
35 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 911, 911-14 (2010).
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however, SEC laws and regulations provide little guidance to manufacturers
that seek to comply with public disclosure requirements. 60 Thus, this section
first details the various rules governing the information disclosures of public
companies, then examines relevant case law to glean conclusions regarding
how these rules are typically applied to publicly-traded companies.
1. Information Disclosure Requirements for Public Companies
A general lesson that can be gathered from the following discussion of
SEC disclosure requirements is that "companies can control what they have
to disclose under [federal securities laws] by controlling what they say to the
market."61 This may involve giving serious thought and consideration to
statements made to investors, consumers, and doctors, as well as ensuring
that disclosures that are made are accurate and complete. The disclosure
obligations of public companies are detailed below.
a. Forms 10-K and 10-Q
The SEC requires publicly-listed companies to submit a Form 10-K
annually and a Form 10-Q quarterly. Both forms require submission of
"Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results
of Operations." 62 Specifically, Instruction 3 to Item 303(a) requires a focus
"on material events and uncertainties known to management that would
cause reported financial information not to be necessaril indicative of
future operating results or of future financial condition."6  The type of
forward-looking information a pharmaceutical company may maintain
regarding products in the development stage, such as negative or
inconclusive clinical trial results, may be subject to disclosure pursuant to
this instruction.
60. Stephanie A. Scharf, et al., Failure to Disclose Material Clinical Trial Results:
Securities Claims, PROD. LIAB. LIT. § 10:3, § 10:3:1 (2011).
61. Press Release, Morrison Foerster LLP, In Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano,
the U.S. Supreme Court Reaffirms that Materiality Depends on a Contextual Analysis of
What a Defendant Says (Mar. 22, 2011), http://www.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/
110322-Securities-Fraud.pdf.
62. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (2010).
63. Id. at Instruction 3.
64. See Cohn & Swick, supra note 59, at 925.
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b. Form 8-K
In addition to these annual and quarterly reports, a Form 8-K is a report
filed with the SEC by public companies to publicly disclose recent material
events. The obligation to file a Form 8-K arises upon the occurrence of
"reportable events," e.g., "includ[ing] entering into material agreements,
taking material actions, or when other types of material events occur that an
investor would find it important to know about."65 The materiality of a
triggering event will be determined by the facts and circumstances
surrounding the event, including the size of the company, the nature of the
business, or the customs of the industry; generally, however, SEC considers
material "matters about which an average prudent investor ought to be
reasonably informed."6 6  In the pharmaceutical companies context, the
announcement of a positive business development, such as FDA approval of
a new drug, or of a negative business development, such as a recall of an
existing product or the denial of FDA approval for a new drug, should be
67
reported on a Form 8-K.
c. Regulation FD
SEC's Regulation FD was designed to prevent public companies from
selectively disclosing market-sensitive information. Pursuant to Regulation
FD, when a public company or any person acting on its behalf discloses
"material nonpublic information" regarding the company to an investment
advisor, a broker or dealer, an investment company, or a holder of the
company's securities who plans to purchase or sell those securities on the
basis of such information, the company must also make a public disclosure
of that information. The public disclosure must be simultaneous in the
case of an intentional disclosure, or made promptly in the case of a non-
intentional disclosure.69 Public disclosures must take the form of a Form 8-
65. PLC Corporate & Securities, Form 8-K, PRACTICAL LAW COMPANY,
http://uslf.practicallaw.com (last visited Apr. 17, 2013).
66. Id.
67. PLC Corporate & Securities, Events and Transactions Triggering a Form 8-K
Filing Chart, PRACTICAL LAW COMPANY, http://uslf.practicallaw.com (last visited Apr.
17, 2013).
68. 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100(a)-(b) (2000).
69. 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100(a)(1)-(2). A disclosure is intentional when the person
making the disclosure knows, or is reckless in not knowing, that the information he or she
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K or other method of disseminating the information "reasonably designed to
provide broad, non-exclusionary distribution of the information to the
public."70  Thus, publicly-traded pharmaceutical companies must remain
aware that answers to market analyst inquiries regarding non-public
information may reveal material information and trigger a requirement to
71publicly disseminate the information.
d. Rule 10b-5
Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act makes it unlawful for any person offering
securities to use "any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the [SEC] may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors." 72 This provision was further codified by SEC Rule 1Ob-5, which
makes it unlawful to "make any untrue statement of a material fact or to
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made,
in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading." 7 3 The Court has implied a private cause of action from the
purpose and text of the 1934 Act. Under this rule, plaintiffs asserting a
section 10(b) claim must prove "(1) a material misrepresentation or omission
by the defendant; (2) scienter; (3) a connection between the
misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or sale of a security; (4)
is communicating is both material and nonpublic. 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(a). Promptly is
defined as being "as soon as reasonably practicable (but in no event after the later of 24
hours or the commencement of the next day's trading on the New York Stock Exchange).
17 C.F.R. § 243.101(d).
70. 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.101(e)(l)-(2).
71. See Cohn & Swick, supra note 59, at 927. This scenario may arise, for example,
following the issuance of a press release. Although the company may have carefully
crafted the release in a manner that couched the information with cautionary language, an
answer to an analyst's subsequent inquiry could trigger a requirement to disclose
additional information to the public that the company had not originally intended to
reveal.
72. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
73. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b).
74. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 318 (2007).
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reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission; (5) economic loss; and (6)
loss causation." 75 Often, the most critical element of a section 10(b) claim
against a pharmaceutical company is the requirement that the plaintiff shows
that defendant made a statement that was "misleading as to a material
fact." 6 The Supreme Court has held that the materiality element is satisfied
when there is "a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact
would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly
altered the 'total mix' of information made available." 77
i. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act ("Reform Act")
Safe Harbor for Predictions
The Reform Act added sections to the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act
providing a "safe harbor" for forward-looking statements made by public
companies.7 8 Under this safe harbor, a company is not liable for forward-
looking statements that are identified as such and accompanied by
meaningful cautionary statements indicating explicit factors that could cause
actual results to differ materially from those predicted.7 9 Additionally, the
safe harbor provides that only companies and executives that meet a high
level of culpability will be liable for predictions. This requires plaintiffs to
plead and prove actual knowledge that the forward-looking statement was
false or misleading.80 On the other hand, many courts have held that some
form of extreme recklessness will satisfy the scienter element of a § 10(b)
75. Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148,
157 (2008).
76. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 238 (1988).
77. Id. at 231-232.
78. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2, 78u-5 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
79. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2(c)(1)(A)(i), 78u-5(c)(1)(A)(i).
80. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2(c)(1)(B) (If the statement is made by a natural person, a
plaintiff must prove that that individual had actual knowledge that the statement was false
or misleading; if made by a business entity, a plaintiff must prove that it was made with
the approval of an executive officer who had actual knowledge that the statement was
false or misleading.).
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claim.8' Therefore, it is quite unclear what practical effect the Reform Act
will have on private shareholder suits.
In addition to these open questions regarding the requisite level of
scienter, the definition of a "meaningful cautionary statement" also remains
undefined. While the House conference report accompanying the Reform
Act noted that boilerplate warnings would not be considered sufficient, as
"cautionary statements must convey substantive information about factors
that realistically could cause results to differ materially from those projected
in the forward-looking statement," it is difficult to predict what sorts of
cautionary language courts would consider merely boilerplate.82 Further
complicating any potential reliance on this statutory safe harbor, projections
tend to be accompanied by the hard, factual information on which they were
based. Because "hard information is not within the statutory protection and
is subject to the standard objections of being misleading or incomplete," if a
question from a market analyst causes a company to offer the hard
information on which predictions were based, the statements are no longer
immune.83
e. Exchange Disclosure Requirements
Finally, beyond the disclosure obligations to the SEC or a company's
shareholders, publicly-listed companies must also provide investors with
continuous disclosures of material information pursuant to the rules of the
various securities exchanges. For example, the New York Stock Exchange
("NYSE") Manual requires companies listed on the exchange to "release
quickly to the public any news or information which might reasonably be
expected to materially affect the market for its securities." 84 It is possible
that clinical trial test results for drugs and devices could be considered
material "given the enormous costs sunk into research and the high market
interest in potential outcomes."85
81. William 0. Fisher, Key Disclosure Issues for Life Sciences Companies: FDA
Product Approval, Clinical Test Results, and Government Inspections, 8 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REv. 115, 120 (2002).
82. H.R. Rep. No. 104-369, at 43 (1995) (Conf. Rep.).
83. Cohn & Swick, supra note 59, at 938-40.
84. NYSE, New York Stock Exchange Manual § 202.5 (last visited May 11, 2013),
http://nysemanual.nyse.com/lcm/.
85. Cohn & Swick, supra note 59, at 926.
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2. Guidelines from Case Law Applying Securities Information
Disclosure Requirements to Publicly-Traded Pharmaceutical
Companies
a. Disclosing Positive Test Results
When publicly-traded pharmaceutical companies receive trial results that
contain some positive information, they may wish to emphasize the good
news in public disclosures. If the product later turns out to be unsuccessful,
however, shareholders may question the company's decision to disclose the
favorable data. Cases arising from disclosures of positive test results
typically arise in three circumstances. In the first scenario, a company
discloses only selected information about tests or trials. Given the volume
of information amassed during the course of a clinical trial, "[a]bsent
publication of virtually all documents created in a clinical trial, every
disclosure about such a trial will be limited to the pieces of information that
management elects to disclose."8 In In re PLC Systems, Inc. Securities
Litigation, PLC reported positive results from trials of its Heart Laser device
in Transmyocardial Revascularization ("TMR"). Plaintiffs criticized a PLC
press release that stated that the trial data confirmed that TMR might be an
effective therapy, without disclosing the fact that TMR appeared to hasten
death for terminal patients suffering from unstable angina. 8 The court
dismissed this claim as immaterial, as a reasonable investor would be
primarily interested in whether TMR might prove to be an effective therapy
for the majority of patients, rather than for a very small subset.
Padnes v. Scios Nova Inc., another example of this first kind of scenario,
involved a press release and a statement in Scios Nova's annual report
representing that Phase 2 clinical trials demonstrated that the drug,
Auriculin, provided a statistically significant reduction in the need for
dialysis in acute renal failure patients.89  One year later, however, the
company announced that preliminary Phase 3 results failed to show that
Auriculin reduced the need for dialysis.90 The plaintiff shareholders asserted
86. Fisher, supra note 81, at 145.
87. In re PLC Systems, Inc. Sec. Litig., 41 F. Supp.2d 106, 119 (D. Mass 1999).
88. See id. at 119-20.
89. Padnes v. Scios Nova Inc., No. C 95-1693 MHP, 1996 WL 539711 at *1-2.
90. Id. at *1.
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that the company should have included different measurements of the Phase
2 study's outcome than those performed by that trial's researchers. The
court dismissed the complaint, noting that, while reasonable minds could
differ with respect to the value of the Phase 2 study in determining the
therapeutic effects of Auriculin, reasonable minds could not conclude that
Scios Nova's failure to exhaustively catalogue those possibilities was
fraudulent.9 1
The second category of cases that involves the disclosure of positive test
results arises when there are internal disagreements within a company
regarding the interpretation of trial outcomes. In an analogous circumstance,
courts typically recognize that the financial forecasting process within a
company involves the comparison of different projections, an exercise of
company judgment, and then a corporate decision on the specific forecast to
use for planning purposes or to release to the public. As long as the
company had a reasonable basis for its forecast, it is not liable for publishing
the one it selects simply because there were also other forecasts that were
proposed within the company. 92 This principle could logically extend to the
interpretation of clinical trial results. Even if there is internal debate within
a pharmaceutical company regarding test results, if the company has a
procedure or process in place to reach an ultimate corporate view, it should
not be held liable for ultimately and thoughtfully discarding one possible
interpretation.93
The third and final scenario that arises in litigation regarding the
disclosure of positive test results occurs when companies release data and
statistics for groups of patients and trial protocols that the financial
community does not fully understand. In In re Synergen, Inc. Securities
Litigation, Synergen issued a media advisory on Phase 2 results for its drug
stating it "reduces mortality in patients with sepsis syndrome." 94  The
subsequent securities lawsuit turned on the meaning of "mortality." One
91. Id. at *5.
92. See Wielgos v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 892 F.2d 509, 516 (7th Cir. 1989)
("Any firm generates a range of estimates internally or through consultants. It may
reveal the projection it thinks best while withholding others, so long as the one revealed
has a 'reasonable basis'-a question on which other estimates may reflect without
automatically depriving the published one of foundation.").
93. See Fisher, supra note 81, at 153-54.
94. In re Synergen, Inc. Sec. Litig., 863 F. Supp. 1409, 1418 (D. Colo. 1994).
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mortality measure is a "survival curve," which measures the number of days
a patient lives during a twenty-eight day trial. This is the meaning of
mortality that Synergen used as the basis for its advisory. On the other hand,
"twenty-eight day mortality" refers to the percentage of patients who are
dead on the twenty-eighth day of the trial.95 Although Synergen argued that
the investment community understood that the advisory was based on
survival curves, the court denied the defendants' motion for summary
judgment on the grounds that there remained a triable issue as to the
market's understanding of Synergen's "mortality" data.96
b. Disclosing Negative Test Results
In addition to issues related to publicizing favorable clinical trial results,
publicly-traded pharmaceutical companies also confront significant
dilemmas when deciding whether negative trial outcomes are material
subject to disclosure requirements. Courts have deemed materiality "one of
the most unpredictable and elusive concepts of the federal securities laws." 97
These questions are particularly difficult for two critical reasons. First, if
materiality is judged by what a reasonable person would consider important
when making an investment decision, the general public's intolerance to
adverse health reports may give rise to a materiality issue before sufficient
data is collected. Second, although pharmaceutical companies use clinical
trials to produce "statistically significant" evidence that a drug or product is
responsible for desired outcomes, the securities law standard of materiality
relies on an entirely different determination. 99
The statistical significance-materiality dichotomy has evolved through
case law over time. The Supreme Court first addressed the standard for Rule
1 Ob-5 materiality in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson. In Basic, plaintiffs alleged that
the target company made material misrepresentations in publicly denying its
participation in merger negotiations during the timeframe when it was
actually participating in these discussions. The Court held that in order to
"fulfill the materiality requirement there must be a substantial likelihood that
95. Id. at 1418-19.
96. Id. at 1419.
97. SEC v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 565 F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir. 1997).
98. Cohn & Swick, supra note 59, at 929.
99. Id. at 929-30.
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the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable
investor as having significantly altered the 'total mix' of information made
available."100 Following Basic, however, circuit courts split on the law of
materiality in various § 10(b) suits involving pharmaceutical companies. The
First, Second, and Third Circuit courts established a distinct materiality
standard for pharmaceutical companies, requiring plaintiffs to allege "that
the claimed adverse event is statistically significant to the use of the drug in
question." 01
This rift was settled in 2011 with the Supreme Court's decision in Matrixx
Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano. In Matrixx, the Court rejected a bright-line
rule requiring that results of a clinical trial be statistically significant in order
to be considered "material" for purposes of disclosure.102  The Court
categorized the "premise that statistical significance is the only reliable
indication of causation" as flawed, given the fact that "medical experts and
the [FDA] rely on evidence other than statistically significant data to
establish an inference of causation."' 0 3  Further, the Court insisted that
"materiality is a fact-specific inquiry, requiring consideration of [the] source,
content, and context [of adverse reports]."' While the Court held that
"something more than the mere existence of adverse event reports is needed
to satisfy" the standard of what a reasonable investor would have viewed as
significantly altering the "total mix" of information made available, "that
something more is not limited to statistical significance." 05  Because the
Court refused to adopt a bright-line rule regarding materiality, going forward
the assessment of whether an adverse event or trial outcome is material will
be decided on a case-by-case basis. This may make it harder for publicly-
traded pharmaceutical companies to dispose of securities class action
100. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988).
101. Benjamin Shook, The Materiality Standard After Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v.
Siracusano, 12 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 369, 377 (2011).
102. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1313-14 (2011).
103. Id. at 1319.
104. Id. at 1321.
105. Id.
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lawsuits at the motion to dismiss or summary judgment phases of
litigation.lo0
While the Court clarified the materiality element of Rule 1Ob-5 claims, the
current status of the rule's scienter element remains uncertain. As
mentioned above, the Reform Act appears to have imposed a scienter
standard of actual knowledge for plaintiffs suing under 1Ob-5. In addition,
the Reform Act heightened the pleading requirements for plaintiffs,
requiring that the complaint "state with particularity facts giving rise to a
strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind." 07
Although these appear to be significant obstacles for plaintiffs, most circuit
courts have nevertheless adopted recklessness as a substitute for the more
demanding intent requirement of scienter. Further, in dicta, the Court in
Matrixx assumed for the sake of argument that deliberate recklessness would
be sufficient to meet the scienter requirement.108 While recklessness is not
an easy allegation to plead and prove, pharmaceutical companies may be
particularly vulnerable to liability as the scienter standard shifts from intent
to recklessness. This is because the public statements of pharmaceutical
companies typically represent only a fraction of the voluminous and detailed
results the companies maintain. Once a suit is initiated, however, all of this
underlying material will be reviewed with the benefit of hindsight, which
may provide plaintiffs with an increased opportunity to "find nuggets that
arguably should have been disclosed."l 09
Beyond these primary questions of materiality and scienter, it is important
to note that a company cannot be liable for failing to publicize a fact, even if
the fact is material, unless the company has an obligation to disclose it."0 In
the context of disclosures of negative clinical trial results, a duty to disclose
a non-public material fact may arise if the company makes statements that
will mislead unless the company also reveals the negative test results. This
duty arises from sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the 1933 Act and Rule lOb-5,
which expressly impose liability for omitting material facts necessary to
106. Scharf, et al., supra note 60, at § 10:3:3.
107. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(b)(2) (2006).
108. Cohn & Swick, supra note 59, at 934.
109. Cohn & Swick, supra note 59, at 935-36.
110. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 239 n.17 (1988) ("Silence, absent a
duty to disclose, is not misleading under Rule 1Ob-5.").
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make statements made non-misleading. Likewise, section 10(b) cases hold
that "when a corporation does make a disclosure-whether it be voluntary or
required-there is a duty to make it complete and accurate." 1 ' Applied in
the context of pharmaceutical companies, where a drug or device company
"has reached a conclusion that test results on a new product are negative, it
may, as a practical matter, be difficult to provide any progress report on the
product to the investment community that fails to include this 'bad' news
without the report being arguably incomplete or misleading."',
12
In Walsingham v. Biocontrol Technology, Inc., the court denied
Biocontrol's motion to dismiss claims that it had failed to disclose
unfavorable test results while simultaneously touting the effectiveness of and
expressing optimism about future FDA approval for its Diasensor 1000
device.1 13 In response to a newspaper article raising doubts about FDA
approval of the device, Biocontrol stated: "If the device does not work, why
struggle so hard to get it to market? Why struggle so hard and long through
the FDA approval process and why would eight of the world's leading
endocrinologists have gone to the FDA to support the Diasensor 1000[?]""
At the time of this statement, however, the company was receiving dismal
test results, causing the court to find it "significant that the defendants'
failure to disclose the test results occurred during a time when they were
issuing what can only be described as very positive presses releases." 5
Even though Biocontrol's comments were largely phrased as rhetorical
questions, this case appears to emphasize that comments implying effective
performance may result in litigation if the company does not simultaneously
disclose negative test results that have not been superseded by positive
ones. Thus, to avoid liability for incomplete or inaccurate disclosures,
111. See Roeder v. Alpha Industries, Inc., 814 F.2d 22, 26 (1st Cir. 1987).
112. Fisher, supra note 81, at 163.
113. Mem. Op. and Order that Defs. Mot. To Dismiss Pursuant to F.R. Civ. P. 9(b)
and 12(b)(6) in Den., Walsingham v. Biocontrol Tech., Inc. 66 F. Supp 2d 669 (W.D. Pa.
1998) No. 96-0089.
114. Fisher, supra note 81, at 164.
115. Walsingham v. Biocontrol Tech., Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 669, 677-78 (W.D. Pa.
1998).
116. Fisher, supra note 81, at 164.
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publicly-traded pharmaceutical companies would be wise to analyze any
disclosures before they are made and consider "whether the information to
be disclosed is accurate, complete, and appropriately contextualized within
the scope of the company's overall clinical development program."11 7
Similarly, although federal securities laws do not impose an explicit duty
to update public disclosures, a duty of this sort may arise in special
situations, such as when a later development makes an earlier statement
misleading.118 Even in this specific scenario, however, the duty to update
appears to be fairly limited. Courts have noted that there is a duty to correct
"when a company makes a historical statement that at the time made, the
company believed to be true, but as revealed by subsequently discovered
information actually was not."I 19 By contrast, this duty to correct is quite
different from a duty to update "if a prior disclosure becomes materially
misleading in light of subsequent events." 2 0 Courts have rejected such a
duty. In the first situation, it is possible that a representative from a
company could make a disclosure that asserts incorrect financial calculations
or inaccurate data; in this case, the company has a duty to correct the
original error. In the second situation, courts are unlikely to find an
obligation to update soft information that is clearly set forth as a
121projection.
117. Scharf, et al., supra note 60, at § 10:3:3.
118. Id.
119. In re Int'l Bus. Machines Corp. Sec. Litig., 163 F.3d 102, 109 (2d Cir.1998)
(noting the duty to correct arises "if and when a speaker learns that a prior statement was
misleading when made.").
120. See Stransky v. Cummins Engine Co., Inc., 51 F.3d 1329, 1332 (7th Cir. 1995)
(amended Apr. 7, 1995) ("Some have argued that a duty to update arises when a company
makes a forward-looking statement - a projection - that because of subsequent events
becomes untrue. . . . This court has never embraced such a theory, and we decline to do
so now.").
121. Cohn & Swick, supra note 59, at 940-41. Notably, however, this issue is not yet
fully resolved. Factors that may affect a court's decision in a particular case may
include: 1) the timing of the projection relative to the discovery of its inaccuracy, 2) the
type of cautionary statements that may have accompanied the projection, 3) the extent of
the discrepancy between the projection and the current information, and 4) a court's
perceived relationship of the statements to attempted stock market manipulation. Id.
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II. INTERNATIONAL CLINICAL TRIAL DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS AND
STANDARDS
A. World Health Organization (WHO)
WHO, in 2005, began urging research institutions and companies to
register all medical studies that test treatments on humans, including the
earliest studies.122 WHO also created the International Clinical Trial
Registry Platform ("ICTRP")-it is not itself a registry but instead a network
of registries.123 Primary registries are WHO-selected and managed by not-
for-profit entities. These registries accept any interventional trials and
provide the data directly to WHO.124 Partner registries are more numerous,
and these include registries that submit data to primary registries but limit
their own registry to trials in a restricted area (i.e., specific disease,
company, academic institution, or geographic region). ICTRP aims to
standardize the way information on medical studies is made available to the
public. As part of this project, WHO recommends that twenty key details,
such as title, funding source, research ethics review, and outcome measures,
be disclosed at the time studies are begun and that results of trials are
subsequently required. 125
B. International Committee of Medical Journal Editors (ICMJE)
In 2005, ICMJE initiated a policy requiring investigators to deposit
information about trial design into an accepted clinical trials registry before
the onset of patient enrollment.' 26 Thus, as a condition of consideration for
122. World Health Organization, Resolution WHA58.34 - Ministerial Summit on
Health Research (May 25, 2005), https://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf files/WHA58/
WHA58_34-en.pdf.
123. See About the WHO ICRP, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int
/ictrp/about/en/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2013).
124. See About Registries, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/ictrp/
network/primary/en/index.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2013).
125. FDAAA Deck, supra note 25, at 78-79.
126. Clinical Trial Registration: A Statement from the International Committee of
Medical Journal Editors, Int'l Comm. Of Med. Editors (ICMJE), Editorial (2005),
available at http://www.icmje.org/clin-trial.pdf.
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publication, ICMJE required registration in a public trials registry.127
Although ICMJE did not advocate any particular registry, its member
journals required authors to register trials in a registry meeting several
criteria, e.g., that it is accessible to the public at no charge, managed by a
not-for-profit, and has a mechanism to ensure the validity of the registration
data. 128
Compared to FDAAA requirements, that require registration of
"applicable clinical trials," which excludes Phase 1 trials and trials for
unapproved drugs, ICMJE requirements apply to all prospective,
interventional human trials.' 2 9 Further, the ICMJE provisions call for peer
review of data, while the FDAAA does not. On the other hand, results
disclosure is not stipulated by the ICMJE policy, whereas the FDAAA
contains the three various stages of results disclosure outlined earlier.1 30
C. Bioethics Scholars and Commentators
Many in the bioethics community make a case for a moral duty to disclose
all relevant adverse clinical trial results that involve harms to prospective
participants in clinical trials. The typical argument can be summarized as
follows: people have a human right not to be placed at risk of harm without
their informed consent, and there is a correlative moral duty not to place
others at risk of harm without the same consent. It follows that if adverse
clinical trial results are not disclosed to prospective participants, then they
are placed at risk of harm without their informed consent. Ergo, there is a
moral duty to disclose adverse clinical trial results to prospective
participants in clinical trials.13 1
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See Laurence Hirsch, Trial Registration and Results Disclosure: Impact of US
Legislation on Sponsors, Investigators, and Medical Journal Editors, 24 CURR. MED.
REs. & Op. 1683 (2008).
131. S. Matthew Lao, et al., The Duty to Disclose Adverse Clinical Trial Results, 9
AM. J. BIOETHICS 24, 25 (2009).
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D. Pharmaceutical Industry and Related Industry Groups
The pharmaceutical industry's reaction to clinical trials reporting has been
mixed, but some individual manufacturers and groups volunteered to make
some clinical trials data public. PhRMA introduced its own clinical trials
database in October 2004. In January 2005, the International Federation of
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and Associations ("IFPMA") announced that
its members would voluntarily disclose summary results of all industry-
sponsored clinical trials. In October 2005, IFPMA announced that it had
launched a search portal of clinical trial registries and databases worldwide.
According to recent comments submitted to NIH by PhRMA:
The pharmaceutical industry is firmly committed to the
transparency of clinical research and safety information. We
recognize that there are important public health benefits associated
with making clinical trial information more widely available to
healthcare practitioners, patients, and others. Clinical trial
registries may assist desperately ill patients and their healthcare
providers in identifying ongoing trials of promising new drugs in
which patients may be eligible to participate. Moreover, clinical
trial results databanks help assure that the results of all meaningful
clinical trials-even trials that are not able to be published in peer-
reviewed journals-are publicly available for review and
consideration by patients, physicians, and others to help inform
treatment decisions.1 32
Additionally, in 2002, PhRMA issued and continues to update its
Principles on Conduct of Clinical Trials and Communication of Clinical
Trial Results. These Principles include a commitment by the industry to
communicate results regardless of whether they were positive, negative, or
inconclusive. In 2004, PhRMA "established a free, centralized, publicly-
available electronic database at www.ClinicalStudyResults.org."l3 3 In 2009,
PhRMA announced it would update its principles to include registering all
clinical trials, including Phase I trials, and also provide results summaries
for all clinical trials involving patients for medicines whose research
programs are discontinued.134
132. PhRMA Comments, supra note 42, at 2.
133. Id. at 2-3.
134. Id.
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III. THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN VARIOUS DISCLOSURE STANDARDS
Before considering how differences among these standards affect real-
world outcomes, it is instructive to first evaluate scenarios where there is
convergence. One example is when a pharmaceutical company, which has
previously discussed its developmental pipeline in its public filings, receives
information that suggests that the timing or scope of a drug approval will
change. This could take any number of forms: a Phase 1 and 2 study
suggests that safety and effectiveness profiles will have the greatest benefit-
risk ratio among a disease subpopulation-perhaps only among patients with
a specific genetic marker; a co-primary endpoint of a Phase 3 effectiveness
study fails to reach statistical significance, forcing the company to consider
narrowing the types of indications or claims that are based on the successful
endpoint alone; or, in an extreme example, early safety observations force a
company to terminate a clinical trial prior to completion and threaten the
approvability of the entire compound. In each of these examples, FDA
would likely require that a sponsor disclose the clinical trial information, as
the data is critical for the evaluation of new or existing claims and
indications. Similarly, investors would reasonably view such information as
material to the valuation of the company, and, would expect disclosure via a
public SEC filing. Here, the public's interests are served by the dual
disclosure already a part of the regulatory process.
Although the various disclosure standards can-and do-overlap, those
instances when they diverge illustrate particular motivations for
harmonization. One example arises where a pharmaceutical company
conducts early studies to support a new indication for a drug that does not
contain significant safety warnings, but where the new studies in a different
patient population give rise to substantial adverse events. In this case,
FDA's post-marketing reporting requirements would require the disclosure
of these safety findings. The SEC, however, arguably does not require
disclosure if the company has not previously discussed the potential for an
expanded indication, though this is not as clear as one would hope given the
potential downsides of incorrectly concluding that SEC disclosure is not
required.136 In this regard, FDA is more restrictive with its requirements,
whereas the SEC is more permissive.
135. These negative safety observations would be reported both as adverse drug
experiences under 21 C.F.R. § 314.80 as well as results of clinical studies not previously
reported to FDA during periodic reporting under 21 C.F.R. § 314.81.
136. Here, arguably, because there was never any "positive" disclosures regarding the
possibility of an expanded indication, there is no need to update those disclosures with
the new information. A shareholder suit, however, could argue that any negative safety
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FDA's disclosure requirements, however, are not always the most
restrictive. Pharmaceutical companies regularly conduct pharmacoeconomic
studies regarding their products. These studies are designed to examine the
cost-effectiveness of a therapy; they do not evaluate safety or effectiveness,
per se. "Positive" pharmacoeconomic information, however, is very
valuable when seeking drug formulary access. Hospitals and insurance
plans, in an effort to increase cost-efficiencies, seek out interventions that
maximize patient benefit while minimizing the overall cost of care. Whether
a drug is listed as a preferred intervention drives how much a patient pays
for that intervention choice, which, in turn, drives physician prescribing
behavior. Pharmacoeconomic study results that are not favorable to a given
drug can have substantial impacts on the overall revenues generated from the
sale of that drug-information that would be market-driving. FDA, on the
other hand, is statutorily antagonistic regarding pharmacoeconomic data.'37
In these circumstances, the SEC is more restrictive than FDA. It is worth
noting, however, that although FDA's approach to pharmacoeconomic data
is relatively well-established for drugs, FDAMA section 114 does not apply
to medical devices, and FDA's Center for Devices and Radiological Health
has not formally stated how it intends to evaluate such data.' 38
As with any regulatory scheme, regulatory uncertainty or divergence
results in hesitancy on the part of corporate counsel. Some companies will
opt to publicly disclose whenever any regulatory body requires disclosure.
Others, however, will use the divergence as a shield to keep information
from being disclosed to the public, even when such information would be
valuable to patients, consumers, healthcare providers, investors, and
regulators. Strategic reasons for non-disclosure are not limited to only self-
preservation; information about a company's clinical trials provide a
window into its mid- and long-term development concepts. In less-regulated
industries, such information would be guarded as trade-secrets. Thus, a
information-and especially such information in the context of a clinical trial-is
material information related to the overall safety profile of the drug, as a whole.
137. FDA, however, is concerned about how pharmaceutical companies use
pharmacoeconomic data in a promotional context. FDAMA amended the FDCA to
permit the use of such data only in the very limited context of discussions with formulary
committee members acting in their advisory role in making formulary decisions. See
FDCA § 502(a), 21 U.S.C. § 352(a) (amended by FDAMA § 114 in 1997).
138. FDAMA § 114 modifies FDCA § 505, which applies to new drugs, but not to
medical devices.
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policy favoring complete disclosure ignores critical intellectual property
interests.
Because different companies will take differing approaches to these
difficult issues, the public cannot reasonably know what information it can
expect from a given company regarding information squarely within the
public's interests. Therefore, coordinated efforts to harmonize the various
disclosure standards will benefit the public, regulators, and corporate
counsel. A single, clear standard levels the playing field and sets
expectations in a predictable manner. It will remove uncertainty, which is a
barrier to innovation.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although both the FDA and SEC have increased regulatory scrutiny on
the clinical trial result disclosures of publicly-traded pharmaceutical
companies, whether through the ClinicalTrials.gov website or in investor
communications, the scope of current disclosure requirements remains
largely undefined. While stakeholders within the pharmaceutical industry
are generally supportive of efforts to increase the transparency of clinical
trials, and recognize the public health benefits associated with making
appropriate clinical trial information widely available, an effective
regulatory approach to these goals must also include protections for
individual privacy, contract rights, and intellectual property. 9 It is critical,
therefore, that the federal agencies involved in regulating the disclosures of
clinical trial results work in cooperation toward a comprehensive and
comprehensible set of regulations, policies, and guidelines that safeguard
patients, investors, and the future of medical and scientific innovation.
139. See PhRMA, Principles on Conduct of Clinical Trials: Communication of
Clinical Trial Results, 1 (2011), http://www.phrma.org/sites/default/files/105/042009
clinical trial-principles-final.pdf.
